Titre : | Estimating the costs of specialised care. |
Titre original: | Estimation des coûts des soins spécialisés |
Titre de série : | CHE Research Paper, 61 |
Auteurs : | S. DAIDONE ; A. STREET ; University of York. Centre for Health Economics. (C.H.E.). York. GBR |
Type de document : | Document de travail |
Editeur : | York : University of York, 2011 |
Format : | 30p., tabl., fig. |
Note générale : | Référence : réf. bibl. |
Langues: | Anglais |
Catégories : |
[BDSP5] Economie santé > Coût santé > Coût hospitalisation [BDSP5] Economie santé > Maîtrise dépense [BDSP5] Etablissement sanitaire > Structure curative > Hôpital [BDSP5] Etudes méthodes et statistiques [NI] > Méthodologie > Evaluation [BDSP5] Géographie politique > Monde > Europe > Iles Britanniques > Royaume Uni [BDSP5] Organisation hospitalière > Gestion hospitalière > Indicateur gestion hospitalière > PMSI > GHM [BDSP5] Protection sociale > Sécurité sociale > Tarification santé > Tarification hospitalière [BDSP5] Sciences économiques > Concept économique > Coût [BDSP5] Spécialité [NI] > Spécialité médicale [BDSP5] Système soins > Financement soins [BDSP5] Thérapeutique |
Résumé : | This paper reports work undertaken for the Department of Health's Payment by Results (PbR) team to investigate whether: the costs associated with specialised activity are significantly different from non-specialised activity within the same Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) ; any differences in costs between specialised and non-specialised activity are due to differences in cost efficiency. This helps address the following PbR objectives: PbR gets the price 'right? for services, by paying a price that ensures efficiency and value for money for the taxpayer, and incentivises the provision of care that is responsive to individual needs; The system is fair and transparent, through consistent fixed price payments to providers based on volume and complexity of activity. In broad terms, our analysis of data from 2008/9 explores whether patients who receive specialized services as part of their care package have higher costs than those who do not. If so, hospitals that treat more patients who receive specialised care might require top-up payments over and above their PbR tariff income. In our assessment we also take account of other factors that might explain costs. These factors include the Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) to which the patient is assigned, various sociodemographic, diagnostic and treatment-related characteristics of the patient, and the hospital in which the patient is treated. In what follows we first briefly set out the reasons why differential payments might be required for specialised services. We then describe how we identify patients as having received specialised care, assign costs to each patient record in HES, assess the costs of provider spells and decide upon an analytical sample. We specify our multiple regression models before providing some descriptive statistics comparing specialised to non-specialised activity. We then estimate models that investigate the extent to which variations in cost are explained by whether or not a patient received a specialized service. |
En ligne : | http://www.york.ac.uk/media/che/documents/papers/researchpapers/CHERP61_specialised_care_costs.pdf |
Exemplaires (1)
Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
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0057894-1 | P149/6 | Document de travail | Documentation IRDES | P : périodiques | Disponible |