| Titre : | Optimal contracts and contractual arrangements within the hospital : bargaining vs take-it-over-or-leave-it offers. |
| Titre de série : | CHE Research Paper, 37 |
| Auteurs : | M.M. GALIZZI ; M. MIRALDO ; University of York. Centre for Health Economics. (C.H.E.). York. GBR |
| Type de document : | Document de travail |
| Editeur : | York : University of York, 2008 |
| Format : | 29p. |
| Langues: | Anglais |
| Catégories : |
[BDSP5] CANDES > ASYMETRIE INFORMATION [BDSP5] Economie descriptive > Contrat [BDSP5] Economie descriptive > Négociation [BDSP5] Etablissement sanitaire > Structure curative > Hôpital [BDSP5] Géographie politique > Monde > Europe > Iles Britanniques > Royaume Uni [BDSP5] Organisation hospitalière [BDSP5] Organisation hospitalière > Gestion hospitalière > Budget hospitalier [BDSP5] Organisation hospitalière > Structure hospitalière > Administration hospitalière [BDSP5] Sciences économiques > Analyse économique [BDSP5] Sciences économiques > Concept économique > Revenu > Type revenu > Rémunération |
| Résumé : | We study the impact of different contractual arrangements within the hospital on the optimal contracts designed by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. We develop a multi-issue bargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital. Results are then compared with a scenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, with managers proposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. Results show that, when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the informational rent arising on information asymmetry is higher in a set up where managers and doctors decide together through a strategic bargaining process than when they act as two decision-making units. |
| En ligne : | http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pdf/rp37.pdf |
Exemplaires (1)
| Code-barres | Cote | Support | Localisation | Section | Disponibilité |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0054620 | P149/6 | Document de travail | Documentation IRDES | P : périodiques | Disponible |